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Abstract
In recent decades, co-authorship and policies aimed at inducing academic collabora-
tion have increased simultaneously. Assuming that intellectual collaboration is exoge-
nously determined, prior studies find a negative relationship between co-authorship and
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of the individual and her opportunity set are endogenously related to both collaboration
and productivity, I instrument the amount of co-authorship by the common research in-
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1 Introduction
Scientific collaboration between authors has substantially increased in recent decades. Data on
economists publishing articles in journals listed in EconLit from 1970 to 2011 shows that the
number of papers written by more than one author stood at 24.7% during the 1970s, while the
proportion of co-authored articles was close to 52% in the 2000s and 62.7% in 2011. Several
authors have provided explanations for this increase, including greater gains from specialization
and division of labor (McDowell and Melvin, 1983), falling communication costs (Hudson, 1996),
a greater pressure to publish, increasing opportunity cost of time of reviewing papers (Barnett
et al., 1988), increasing uncertainty in the editorial review process (Barnett et al., 1988), and
the possible increase in productivity through collaboration (Laband and Tollison, 2000), among
others. Governmental policies aimed at encouraging collaboration have also increased in recent
decades. These policies are based on the assumption that intellectual collaboration results
in productivity gains for the researchers. Some examples of these policies are the EU-funded
research networks (Commission of European Communities, 2006) and the national Spanish In-
genio 2010 program (Ministry of Education and Science, 2006). In both programs, researchers
are required to collaborate as a condition to obtain research funding. Other examples of policies
encouraging academics to collaborate are internal departmental policies (such as evaluations
or rankings and employment or tenure decisions that require a minimum amount of publica-
tions) that do not fully discount articles by the number of authors.1 Consequently, scientific
collaboration is affected by scientific policies that have progressively stimulated intellectual col-
laboration (Melin and Persson, 1996), and if intellectual collaboration did not increase the sum
of research produced, a policy change would be required.2
This paper studies the effect of research collaboration on research output and contributes
to answering these questions: Does co-authorship lead to higher academic productivity? Is
the effect of co-authorship the same for every individual? What are the channels through
which collaboration might affect individual productivity? Examining data on economists over
a 42 year period, from 1970 to 2011, I find that after taking into account the endogeneity
inherent in the co-authorship formation process through an instrumental variable strategy,
1Sauer (1988) estimates using data on salaries and publications that the discount factor applied by public
institutions to co-authored articles is not significantly different from one over the number of authors. Schinski et
al. (1998) using a more recent dataset finds that universities do not regularly discount co-authored publications
by the number of authors.
2Ubfal and Maffioli (2011), Bozeman and Corley (2004) and Lee and Bozeman (2005), Defazio et al. (2009)
find a positive relationship between research grants and intellectual collaboration.
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co-authorship leads to higher individual academic productivity. However, this effect varies
significantly between low- and high-productive individuals.
2 Related literature
The empirical literature examining the relationship between co-authorship and academic pro-
ductivity has increased in recent years. However, there is no agreement, as to whether this
relationship is positive, negative, or non-existent. Laban and Tollison (2000) provide evidence
that co-authored scientific papers are more likely to be accepted for publication than sole-
authored papers.3 Recently, Wuchty et al. (2007) and Chung et al. (2009) find that papers
with more authors are cited more often. In contrast, Medoff (2003) shows that collaboration
does not result in significantly higher-quality research in economics and Hollis (2001) finds that
co-authorship leads to lower research output.4 In a model of teamwork formation, an author
would decide to collaborate if the expected utility from collaboration is larger than the ex-
pected utility from sole-authorship. Therefore, if the utility only depends on research output
we should expect a positive effect of co-authorship on productivity, as two authors would en-
gage in a collaboration if the expected productivity from this collaboration is higher than the
expected productivity from working alone. This raises an interesting question: why is the effect
of co-authorship not always unambiguously positive?5 The negative effect found in previous
studies can be explained by the following reasons:
i) As Hollis (2001) points out, other factors like the increase in salary through collaboration
(when individual departments do not discount for promotion articles by the number of authors),
risk diversification, and friendship may enter into the utility function. From a social point of
view, co-authorship would be desirable if it increased total research output, i.e. society would
not care about the private increase in salaries and the private enjoyment of friendship through
collaboration. Therefore, salaries and friendships may induce authors to collaborate on projects
that would be more efficiently done through sole-authorship. For example, authors may choose
to collaborate with a mismatched co-author (same-skill co-author) or distant co-authors only
to enjoy the consumption benefit from social activities (Hamermesh and Oster, 2002), even if
3Presser (1980) and Zuckerman and Merton (1973) also find a positive correlation between co-authored
articles and the probability of acceptance.
4Acedo et al. (2006) find very weak evidence that co-authored management papers are of higher quality
than sole-authored papers.
5I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this question.
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the coordination costs and duplication of effort are more likely in such cases.6
ii) There are also negative externalities from collaboration that may lead to a negative effect
on productivity, like the free-rider problem (Hudson, 1996) and the externality through time
devoted by collaborators to projects with other authors (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), which
I call congestion externality. If your co-authors are busy because they are working on many
projects at the same time, they have less time to devote to your project: therefore, you will have
to devote more time to the collaboration and hence have less time to do other work.7 However,
busier co-authors may also have a positive effect on productivity by stimulating authors to
work harder, so the net effect of the congestion externality is ambiguous.
iii) The negative relationship found in previous studies can also be explained by the potential
endogeneity of teamwork formation: that is, the amount of co-authorship depends on the
opportunity set the individual faces. Hollis (2001) defines the opportunity set as the projects
conceived by the author and projects offered to the individual as a co-author. The creativity
of researchers may be cyclical, i.e. authors may have periods with better ideas than in other
periods. In periods with a lack of ideas, authors will be more willing to collaborate, while in
periods of inspiration, authors are likely to share only the ideas that require the skills of others.
Then good ideas not requiring the specialization of others will be sole-authored, resulting
in a negative correlation between co-authorship and productivity (Hollis, 2001). I focus on
the endogeneity of the co-authorship formation as the main econometric problem driving this
negative relationship.
Lee and Bozeman (2005) were the first to control for the possibility that co-authorship is
formed endogenously: that is, that authors choose whom to work with. They deal with the
endogeneity problem by instrumenting co-authorship using a ‘cosmopolitan scale’ that ranges
from 0 to 5 depending on the location of the co-author. For example, the instrument is 0 if the
author collaborates with a co-author from the same institution and in the same work group,
6Hamermesh and Oster (2002) find that distant collaboration is less productive than close co-authorship,
but authors decide to collaborate with distant co-author to enjoy the consumption benefits of joint research.
The private enjoyment from friendship compensates the loss of research output. Melin (2000) surveyed 195
university professors about their motives for collaboration: 41% of the professors answered that they decided
to collaborate because the co-author had special competence, while 20% cite ‘social reasons’ as their motive for
collaboration.
7The co-authorship model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) predicts that the private network of authors will
tend to be over-connected because they are not able to internalize the negative effect their new links have on
the productivity of links with existing co-authors. In these cases, science policy may induce more collaboration
than the socially optimum level.
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and 5 if the author collaborates with a researcher from a foreign institution. However, there
is a potential correlation between the instruments and productivity, as links with international
colleagues will provide access to new ideas and resources. Moreover, they assume that the
productivity of an author is only a function of the number of articles published in a given
period. Instead, I consider that the productivity of an author not only depends on the number
of articles published by the individual, but also on the quality of each article proxied by journal
quality impact factor.
While previous studies have improved our knowledge on the role of intellectual collaboration
in explaining changes in research output, data limitations and especially difficulty in finding
exogenous variation in teamwork formation has resulted in treating co-authorship as exogenous.
I attempt to overcome some of the endogeneity difficulties by drawing on methods developed
for social network analysis. Recently, Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and Lee et al. (2010) provide the
necessary and sufficient conditions under which peer effects can be identified using network data.
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) propose the use of peers’ peers (and peers’ peers’ peers) characteristics
as instrumental variables for the peers’ behavior. Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009) and Lin (2010)
use friendship networks of adolescents derived from the Add-Health data to identify peer and
social network effects in education.
A few recent studies attempt a joint estimation of network formation and network effects to
deal with the selection effects in the formation of links. For example, Mihaly (2009) developed
an empirical strategy based on a two-step selection model, a` la Heckman, to control for endoge-
nous friendship formation with the aim of measuring the effect of peer interactions on student
academic achievement. Conti et al. (forthcoming) estimate the effect of popularity (measured
as the number of friendship nominations received from schoolmates) on the labor market re-
turns controlling for the selection of friendship. Their empirical strategy is to simultaneously
estimate the outcome of interest together with the friendship formation process. Liu et al.
(2012) used the Add-Health data to develop a network formation model to identify key players
in criminal activity and to estimate peer effects in delinquent adolescent networks, extending
the identification strategy proposed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and Lee et al. (2010).
In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of co-authorship on individual productivity and
provide evidence of the existence of peer effects (positive knowledge spillovers) and congestion
externalities in academia 8 I use network data among economists to exploit exogenous variation
of co-authorship through variation in the commonality of research interests between the author
8Azoulay (2010) and Waldinger (2010) examine peer effects in science using the unanticipated removal of
individuals as a natural experiment.
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and the co-authors’ co-authors accumulated in the past. This identification strategy is related
to the one proposed by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) to estimate peer effects with network data, as I
use the structure of the network in the past to infer exogenous variation in future co-authorship.
My main finding is that once I simultaneously control for time invariant unobservable factors
and for the potential endogeneity inherent in the co-authorship formation, co-authorship leads
to higher academic productivity. This result is robust and statistically significant.
3 Estimation framework
This section defines the co-authorship networks, and describes the empirical model, the main
factors related to research output, and the identification strategy to estimate the causal effect
of co-authorship on academic productivity.
3.1 Co-authorship networks
Let Gt,s denote a co-authorship network obtained using all joint publications from year t−(s−1)
to t. Two authors have a link in this co-authorship network, Gt,s, if they have published a co-
authored article over the period t− (s−1) to t, where s denotes the number of years that a link
between two authors is maintained. For example, in a 5-year co-authorship network (s = 5) if
an author i publishes an article with author j at year 2001, the link between these two authors is
assumed to last until year 2005. This is consistent with the recent empirical network literature,
where 3-year co-authorship networks (Gonzalez-Brambila, 2013), 5-year co-authorship networks
(Ductor et al., 2013), or even 10-year co-authorship networks (Fafchamps et al., 2010) are
considered. As in Ductor et al. (2013), I define Ni(Gt,s) as the co-authors of author i in
the co-authorship network Gt,s and N
2
i (Gt,s) as the co-authors’ co-authors accumulated from
t− (s− 1) to t.
The research output and co-authorship are measured in the same time window as the co-
authorship network, Gt,s. The long time-horizon of the research output, co-authorship, and
network variables is standard in the literature (Hollis, 2001; Ductor et al., 2013; Gonzalez-
Brambila, 2013; He et al. 2009; Ubfal and Maffioli, 2011; Carillo et al., 2013) and takes into
account the time that it takes for the externalities obtained from intellectual collaboration to
be transformed into research output. This long horizon also mitigates the problem caused by
the delays in the publication process in economics. Ellison (2002) finds that the average time
lag between the moment a paper is submitted to a journal and the moment it is published
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varies greatly both between and within journals. He finds that the average lag varies from 9
to 29 months depending on the journal. This delay in economic publication could lead to a
concentration of publications in some periods, which do not correspond to the exact periods
where the authors were working on the projects. As a robustness check, I present results
without aggregating research output and considering one-year network variables.
3.2 Empirical model
The primary equation of interest is the productivity or output function which is given by,
yi;t,s = ρCi;t,s +D
′
i,tω + β1Hi;t,s + β2n¯i;t,s + β3q¯1i;t,s + β4q¯2i;t,s + µi + µt + εi;t,s. (1)
where yi;t,s is productivity over the period t−(s−1) to t. The variable Ci;t,s is the co-authorship
variable obtained as the proportion of co-authored articles from t−(s−1) to t.9 The time-varying
factors are: career time dummies, Di,t, the degree of research specialization of the author from
period t− (s− 1) to t, Hi;t,s, the average number of co-authors’ papers accumulated in the co-
authorship network Gt,s, n¯i;t,s, the average co-authors’ productivity accumulated in the network
Gt,s, q¯1i;t,s and the average co-authors’ co-authors productivity in network Gt,s, q¯2i,t,s. An
individual fixed effects, µi, is also included to account for all time-invariant unobserved factors,
such as innate ability, nationality, gender, school education, and others. Year dummies, µt, are
included to account for any possible time trends in collaboration and individual performance.
The time varying error is εi,t, and the main parameter of interest is ρ, which captures the effect
of co-authorship on productivity.
3.3 Defining co-authorship and productivity
The amount of co-authorship by author i from period t− (s− 1) to t, Ci;t,s, is measured as the
ratio between the number of co-authored articles and the total number of articles published by
the individual during the period t− (s− 1) to t. Formally, this variable is defined as:
Ci;t,s =
nci;t,s
ni;t,s
where nci;t,s is the number of co-authored articles published from t − (s − 1) to t and ni;t,s is
the total number of articles published over period t− (s− 1) to t.
9For robustness, I also consider the average number of co-authors as the co-authorship variable. See section
6.
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The productivity of author i accumulated from t− (s− 1) to t is measured as follows:
qi;t,s =
S∑
j=1
pagesj ∗ qualityj
Number of authorsj
,
where j denotes an article and S is the total number of articles published by author i between
t − (s − 1) and t, i.e. the productivity variable, qi;t,s, is the sum of the productivity of each
article, qj =
pagesj∗qualityj
Number of authorsj
, over period t− (s− 1) and t.
The ‘pages’ variable measures the relative length of the article and is given by the number
of pages of the article divided by the average number of pages of the articles published in the
same journal. For robustness, I also use as productivity only the journal quality index divided
by the number of authors who worked on the article. Thus, I assume that longer than average
papers are more valuable pieces of research.10 This is consistent with Laband (1986), who finds
a positive relationship between article length and number of citations.11
Observe that productivity is discounted by the number of authors. Since society would ben-
efit from maximizing total research output (the sum of the output produced by all researchers),
we should only attribute a share of a co-authored paper to an individual when evaluating their
performance (Hollis, 2001). Note that if we do not discount co-authored articles by the number
of authors, the effect of co-authorship on total research output is unambiguously positive, as a
co-authored publication would account for more than the same publication written by a single
author. Another reason to discount co-authored articles by the number of authors is to evaluate
the externalities from collaboration related to quality and not to the opportunities to publish
more articles within a given period.
The variable ‘quality’j is a measure of the quality of the journal in which the article, j, was
published. This measure is used in Ductor et al. (2013) and is based on the work of Kodrzycki
and Yu (2006) – hereafter KY. KY applies an iterative process and weight citations depending
on the influence of the citing journal. In computing the index, KY exclude self-citations and
use eight-year period citations to control for journal age. The initial step to obtain the KY
index is to calculate the number of citations received by an economic journal i (adjusted by
10As pointed out by Sauer (1988), if journal editors act as value maximizers when allocating space, longer
articles are more valuable than those of lesser length (on average).
11The number of pages for each article has been truncated from above 50 pages. The main idea is not to
give so much extra value to literature review articles as in general a literature review paper is much longer than
the average article. The results are robust to the truncation and exclusion of length as a determinant factor of
productivity.
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the number of articles published in journal i) from other economics journals:
Qi,0 =
∑n
j=1Cij/ai∑n
k=1Ckj/aj
,
qualityi,0 = [Qi,0/Max{Qi,0}] ∗ 100,
where Qi,0 denotes the initial citations index for journal i, ai and aj are the number of articles in
journal i and j, respectively, and n is the number of economics journals. By dividing citations
by the number of articles published in that journal, KY obtain a journal impact factor adjusted
by its influence per article. The subsequent iterations are given by:
Qi,t =
n∑
j=1
[
Cij/ai∑n
k=1Ckj/aj
]
qualityj,t−1,
qualityi,t = [Qi,t/Max{Qi,t}] ∗ 100.
The iterative process continues until it converges.12 As the KY index is not available for all the
journals listed in EconLit, I use the predicted impact factor obtained by Ductor et al. (2013) for
those journals not listed in KY. 13 The impact factor, ‘quality’j, relies on the assumption that
the journal quality is a good predictor of the quality of the article published by the author.14
As a robustness check, I use the Journal Citation Reports in social sciences (JCR), developed
by Thomson Reuters (2013). I do not use citations because of the potential delay between the
time of publication and the moment the article accumulates citations. This delay would imply
that juniors researchers and recent articles had a lower productivity per se.15
In most of the tables, the period of analysis is a five-year over rolling window (s = 5).
This aggregation accounts for the lags in economic publication and for the time needed to
12See Kodrzycki and Yu (2006) for further details.
13Ductor et al. (2013) predict the impact index of journals not included in the KY list by regressing the
KY index on the number of published articles per year, the impact factor, the immediacy index, the Tinbergen
Institute Index, an economics dummy, interaction terms between the economics dummy and the impact factor,
and various citation measures. They then use the predicted value obtained from this regression as an impact
index for journals not included in the KY list.
14Recently, Laband (2013) shows that journal quality is a useful predictor of citations at time of publication.
15There are also issues related to citations of working paper versions of subsequently published articles, and
pertaining to the relative ranking of citing journals and authors. Another reason for why I do not use citations
is that gathering information on citations for more than 550,000 articles and for every period from 1974 to
2011 is prohibitively costly. Every measure of academic productivity is subject to criticism. Even if the journal
quality is not the best proxy of research output, the quality of the journal is important for economists, since
they are often recruited, promoted, tenured, and recognized according to the quality of the journals they have
been published in (Laband, 2013). Previous literature examining the effect of research collaboration on research
output finds similar results when they consider the quality impact factor and article citations as proxies of
research output (He et al., 2009).
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transform the externalities obtained from co-authorship into research output. However, as the
five-year period is arbitrary – since there is no evidence about the time needed to transform the
externalities accrued from intellectual collaboration into research output, I also consider two-
and three-year over rolling windows and results without aggregating at all, i.e. for one year.
The productivity variable in the five-year period analysis is given by:
qi;t,5 = (qi,t−4 + qi,t−3 + qi,t−2 + qi,t−1 + qi,t)/5
I follow Ductor et al. (2013) and use the log(x + 1) transformation to reduce the impact of
high-productive individuals on the estimates. Thus, the dependent variable in the five-year
over rolling window is:
yi;t,5 = log(qi;t,5 + 1)
Similarly, for the one-year period analysis the dependent variable, yi;t,1,is given by log(qi,t + 1).
3.4 Time-varying factors
Productivity might be affected by important time-varying factors such as changes in the degree
of specialization, the time devoted by co-authors to other projects, the quality of co-authors,
or the quality of the co-authors’ co-authors. The proxy variables for these time-varying factors
are as follows:
Career time dummies Di,t, are included to control for the effect of each year of experience
on academic productivity. Experience in any field or job is one of the main factors influencing
productivity. Moreover, more experienced authors are more likely to initiate a project with
someone else as they have more contacts and therefore more collaboration opportunities.
Let ti,0 denote the first year publication of author i and define the career time as ci,t = ti−ti,0.
Then, as in Ductor et al. (2013), I create dummy variables for each value of the career time
variable, ci,t.
The degree of research specialization, Hi;t,s, controls for the potential effects of specialization
on productivity. Specialization allows a scientist to become an authority on a given subject
(Hackett, 2005).16 On the other hand, studying a wide range of topics may facilitate the
generation of new ideas and enable a researcher to tackle projects that require a broader view –
as the researcher has more diverse knowledge.17 Moreover, specialization might also affect the
amount of collaboration, as overly specialized authors may not be able to tackle projects that
16Leahey (2006) found that specializing improves productivity.
17Belmaker et al. (2010) found that both over-specialization and over-generalization are detrimental to
academic success.
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require knowledge of different fields. Therefore, they may be more willing to collaborate than
authors who have more diverse knowledge.
To measure the degree of specialization of an author I use the Herfindahl index. This index is
obtained using the fraction of articles published by author i in the field f from period t−(s−1)
to t. Formally, this index is defined as:
Hi;t,s =
F∑
f=1
(
nfi;t,s
ni;t,s
)2
,
where F is the number of fields, nfi;t,s is the number of articles published between t − (s − 1)
and t in field f and ni;t,s =
∑F
f=1 n
f
i;t,s is the total number of articles published over the period
t − (s − 1) to t. To construct this variable, I consider the first two digits of the JEL codes
to categorize articles into 121 subfields, f . This measure takes value from 1/F , reflecting the
maximum degree of diversity, to 1 if the author writes all their articles in the same field. Higher
values of this index indicate a higher degree of specialization of the author.
Average number of articles of the co-authors, n¯i;t,s, is a proxy for the time devoted by i’s
co-authors to other projects with other authors – i.e. congestion externality. The time allocated
by i’s co-authors to other projects with other authors might reduce the opportunities of author
i to initiate new projects, as he or she will have to devote more time to the collaboration. On
the other hand, working with busier co-authors may increase the flow of ideas transferred from
the busier co-authors to author i through co-authors’ co-authors. Thus, the effect of congestion
externality on productivity is ambiguous. This variable is computed as:
n¯1i;t,s =
∑
j∈Ni(Gt,s) n
−i
jt
|Ni(Gt,s)| ,
where
∑
j∈Ni(Gt,s) n
−i
jt is the number of articles published by all the co-authors of author i over
the period t−(s−1) to t, excluding the articles co-authored with author i. The average number
of articles of the co-authors variable is set to zero when the author has no co-authors in the
network Gt,s.
Average co-authors’ productivity, q¯1i;t,s, controls for the co-authors’ quality - in terms of
productivity. This variable is defined as,
q¯1i;t,s =
∑
j∈Ni(Gt,s) q
−i
jt
|Ni(Gt,s)| ,
where
∑
j∈Ni(Gt,s) q
−i
jt is the research output produced by each co-author j from period t−(s−1)
to t, excluding the co-authored articles published with author i. |Ni(Gt,s)| is the number of
co-authors of author i accumulated from t− (s− 1) to t. The average co-authors’ productivity
is also set to zero when author i has no co-authors in the network Gt,s.
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Average co-authors’ co-author productivity, q¯2i;t,s, captures the co-authors’ co-authors’ qual-
ity, as an author may benefit indirectly from the diffusion of ideas between co-authors’ co-
authors and their co-authors. This variable is obtained as:
q¯2i;t,s =
∑
j∈N2i (Gt,s) q
−Ni
jt
|N2i (Gt,s)|
,
where
∑
j∈N2i (Gt,s) q
−Ni
jt is the research output produced over period t − (s − 1) to t by all the
co-authors’ co-authors accumulated from t−(s−1) to t, excluding the output produced between
these co-authors’ co-authors and the co-authors of author i, as the latter output is included
in q¯1i;t,s. |N2i (Gt,s)| is the number of co-authors’ co-authors in the network Gt,s. The average
co-authors’ co-author productivity is set to zero when the author has no co-authors’ co-authors.
3.5 Econometric strategy
The identification of the co-authorship parameter, ρ, comes from past variation in the research
overlap between author i and their potential co-authors. Therefore, to eliminate the individual
fixed effects, µi, Equation 1 is transformed using first differencing instead of within transfor-
mation, as applying the latter would create a spurious correlation between the average of the
instrumental variables and the productivity.18 The first difference equation is given by:
(yi;t,s − yi;t−1,s) = ρ(Ci,t,s − Ci,t−1,s) + (D′i,t −D′i,t−1)ω + β1(Hi;t,s −Hi;t−1,s) (2)
+β2(n¯i;t,s − n¯i;t−1,s) + β3(q¯1i;t,s − q¯1i;t−1,s) + β4(q¯2i;t,s − q¯2i;t−1,s)
+(µt − µt−1) + (εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s).
The main econometric problem is the endogenous co-authorship formation. Authors choose
whom to work with, and these associations may be influenced by unobservable characteristics.
For example, an author may choose to collaborate because some ideas are hard to tackle
individually or because they prefer to work with authors that have similar characteristics or
intellectual skills. In particular, a high assortativity in the matching process is observed in
the scientific network, which suggests that less-able authors mainly collaborate with authors
of a similar type. If this selection were ignored, its effect would be incorrectly attributed to
collaboration and biased coefficients would be obtained.
To correct for this type of bias, an instrumenting strategy is implemented. Equation 2 is
estimated by an efficient two-step generalized method of moments (GMM), instrumenting Ci;t,s
18For robustness, I also consider the forward orthogonal deviations. Results are qualitatively the same and
are available in the supplementary material.
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by: the commonality research interests between author i and the co-authors’ co-authors that
author i accumulated in the past network, Gt−s−1,s, and its quadratic term.
As Fafchamps et al. (2010) point out, one of the most important factors in determining the
likelihood of collaboration is some commonality of research interest between the authors. On
the other hand, collaboration is unlikely when there is too much overlap in skills. Hence, the
quadratic term of the common research interests is included to allow for potential non-linear
effects between collaboration and research overlap.
I obtain the proxy for research overlap between author i and their potential co-authors (co-
authors’ co-authors in the past network), N2i (Gt−s−1,s), using the cosine similarity measure as
in Fafchamps et al. (2010).19 This measure is computed as the cosine of two different vectors.
One of the vectors, xif ;t−s−1,s, captures the degree of specialization of author i and includes the
fraction of articles published by author i in each field f over the period t−s−s to t−s−1, where
fields are identified using the first two digits of the JEL codes. The other vector, x
N2i (Gt−s−1,s)
f ;t−s−1,s ,
contains the fraction of articles published by all their co-authors’ co-authors accumulated over
the period t− s− s to t− s− 1 in each field.20 Using these two vectors, the cosine similarity
measure is computed as:
w2i;t−s−1,s =
∑
f x
i
f ;t−s−1,sx
N2i (Gt−s−1,s)
f ;t−s−1,s√∑
f (xf ;t−s−1,s)
2∑
f
(
x
N2i (Gt−s−1,s)
f ;t−s−1,s
)2 .
This commonality research index takes a value from 0 to 1.21 The higher the index, the stronger
the research overlap between author i and their potential co-authors. The second instrument is
the square of the cosine similarity measure, w22i;t−s−1,s, and it is introduced to account for the
potential inverted-U relationship documented by Fafchamps et al. (2010). These instruments
19See Fafchamps et al. (2010) for more details.
20To illustrate the definition of the instrument I consider the following example: suppose author i published
over the period t−10 to t−6 two different articles, a single-authored article with JEL codes A11, J44, and O30
and a co-authored article with JEL codes A14, D85, and Z13, then the element of vector xif ;t−6,5 corresponding
to field A1 would take value 2/6, the elements corresponding to fields J4, O3, D8 and Z1 would be assigned
1/6 and the rest of the elements would be equal to 0. Suppose that the co-authored article was written with
two co-authors, h and k. Author h has two co-authors different from i, l and m, over the period t − 10 to
t − 6, while k only collaborated with author i during this period. Therefore, the co-authors’ co-authors over
the period t − 10 to t − 6, N2i (Gt−6,5), are authors l and m. Finally, the vector xN
2
i (Gt−6,5)
f ;t−6,5 is obtained as the
vector xif ;t−6,5 but looking at the first two digits of the JEL codes of all the articles published by author l and
m over the period t− 10 to t− 6.
21To avoid missing information, the commonality research index is set to zero when the authors has no
co-authors’ co-authors in the past network.
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control for the endogeneity of co-authorship by capturing the extent of matching on the overlap
in research interests of author i with their potential co-authors.
Since the co-authorship networks Gt,s and Gt−1,s contain many similar links and the fields of
specialization of each authors do not change regularly, the instruments w2i;t−s−1,s and w22i;t−s−1,s
are quite persistent over time, so ∆w2i;t−s−1,s would not contain relevant information to infer
exogenous variation in Ci,t,s. To avoid the problems of weak instruments, I consider the in-
strumental variables in levels. This alternative was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
who developed a GMM estimator using lagged levels of the endogenous variables – internal
instruments – as instruments for the equation in first differences. Instead, I use the lagged level
of the commonality research interest between an author and their potential co-authors and its
square – external instruments – as instruments for the difference in the amount of collaboration.
Thus, the first-stage regression is given by:
(Ci,t,s − Ci,t−1,s) = (D′i,t −D′i,t−1)γ + θ1(Hi;t,s −Hi;t−1,s) + θ2(n¯i;t,s − n¯i;t−1,s) (3)
+θ3(q¯1i;t,s − q¯1i;t−1,s) + θ4(q¯2i;t,s − q¯2i;t−1,s) + (µt − µt−1)
+φ1w2i;t−s−1,s + φ2w22i;t−s−1,s + (ui;t,s − ui;t−1,s).
As both the productivity and the co-authorship variables are likely to be correlated over time,
I cluster standard errors by authors. The assumption imposed by the efficient two-step GMM
estimator is that the variation in the error term is uncorrelated with past research overlap be-
tween author i and their potential co-authors.22 Formally, the two-step efficient GMM estimator
relies upon the following moment conditions:
E((εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s)w2i;t−s−1,s) = 0 =⇒
∑
i
w2i;t−s−1,s(εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s) = 0, (4)
E((εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s)w22i;t−s−1,s) = 0 =⇒
∑
i
w22i;t−s−1,s(εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s) = 0, (5)
E((εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s)(Xi;t,s −Xi;t−1,s)) = 0 =⇒
∑
i
(Xi;t,s −Xi;t−1,s)(εi;t,s − εi;t−1,s) = 0, (6)
where Xi;t,s includes all the regressors of Equation 3 except the instruments. Although, the
average co-authors’ productivity, average co-authors’ co-authors’ productivity, and the average
22I used the two-step GMM estimator because it is asymptotically more efficient under heteroskedasticity than
the instrumental variable (IV) two-stage least squares estimator (Baum et al., 2003). The same conclusions are
obtained if the model is estimated by the IV two-stage least squares.
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number of co-authors’ papers might be endogenous to productivity, we can observe in the Boot-
strap Hausman Test provided in Table 3 that their inclusion does not affect the co-authorship
coefficient significantly. The instruments, w2i;t−s−1,s and w22i;t−s−1,s are valid as long as the
orthogonality conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied. These assumptions are plausible as these
potential co-authors are not current co-authors’ co-authors but past co-authors’ co-authors.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the research overlap would affect the future productivity of an
individual through channels other than co-authorship, as this variable is only related to the
matching process.23
4 Data
I use information on all articles published between 1970 and 2011 in journals listed in EconLit,
a bibliography of journals in economics compiled by the American Economic Association.24 It
covers over 550,000 articles published in more than 1,000 journals. EconLit does not provide
authors’ names for articles published by more than 3 authors before 1999. As a result, these
articles are excluded from the analysis for the period 1970 to 1999.25 EconLit starts to provide
author’s names for all articles from 2000; hence, I consider all the articles, including those
published by more than 3 authors from 2000 to 2011. The panel data start for each individual
with their first publication and extend to the last observed publication of the author, or 2011.26
As already pointed out by Van der Leij and Goyal (2011), a significant fraction of economists
in the EconLit database publish very infrequently and may not publish a single article over a
10-year period. Note that whenever qi;t,s = 0, i is by definition not linked to anyone in Gt,s
and co-authorship, Ci;t,s, is missing. The past network used to create the commonality research
interest, Gt−s−1,s, is also likely to be missing for these non-research-active authors. Moreover, I
am interested in explaining the effect of co-authorship on productivity for individuals who are
research-active, i.e. authors who devote an important fraction of their time to research. For
these reasons, I restrict attention to individuals who at every point t have published at least 1
23See the supplementary material for the robustness of the instruments to a potential internal validity threat.
24https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/
25As Van der Leij and Goyal (2011) point out, in the EconLit database from 1970 to 1999, 77% of the co-
authored articles were written by 2 authors, 19% by 3 authors, and 4% by 4 or more authors. Moreover, Van
der Leij (2006, pp. 53–56) show that the co-authorship network statistics are practically unaffected when (for
a subset of the data) articles with 4 or more authors are included.
26A subset of this data (articles published from 1970 to 1999) is used by Goyal et al. (2006), Fafchamps et
al. (2010), Van der Leij and Goyal (2011), and Ductor et al. (2013).
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piece in the previous 10 years, i.e. active authors.27
I also exclude observations relative to authors in the earliest stage of their career, since the
model is estimated in first difference and the instruments, which are based on past information,
from t − s − s to t − s − 1, are not defined. For example, in the 5-year over rolling window
analysis, the instruments are obtained using potential co-authors accumulated from t − 10 to
t − 6; hence, I lose the first six observations of each author or authors who have not been in
academia for at least six years. Most of these observations and authors are considered in the
one-year period analysis presented in the robustness section (section 6), since in the one-year
period I only lose the first two observations.
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the percentage of co-authored articles across time and journal quality. I consider
all articles published from 1970 to 2011 in an economic journal listed in EconLit. The proportion
of co-authored articles published in top-tier journals over the period 1970–2011 with a quality
index above 50 is higher than the lowest-tier journals with a quality index below 1. In particular,
52% of the articles published in top-tier journals are co-authored, while 40% of the articles
published in the lowest-tier journals are co-authored. The rising pattern in co-authorship
varies across journals: the increase of co-authored articles from 1970 to 1999 is higher in top-
tier journals than in the lowest-tier journals. This pattern is reversed from 2000 to 2011, where
the highest increase in the proportion of co-authored articles is in the lowest-tier journals.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the different variables used in the estimation. Column
1 presents summary statistics for authors with average lifetime co-authorship below 0.5 (low
average co-authorship). Column 2 provides statistics for authors with average lifetime co-
authorship between 0.5 and 1 (high average co-authorship). Note that for authors with a low
average lifetime co-authorship the annual mean productivity is 1.92, while for those authors
with a high lifetime average co-authorship the mean productivity is 2.33. Authors who tend
to collaborate more during their career have a lower average co-authors’ productivity and co-
authors’ co-authors’ productivity. Also note the high variability of the productivity and network
variables, whose standard deviation is generally much higher than the mean.
27For robustness, I also present results using the full sample of authors and replacing missing values of co-
authorship and network variables with zero. The full sample is not considered in the main analysis as the
replacement could introduce a positive spurious correlation between co-authorship and productivity, since co-
authorship is certainly zero when output is zero, but is likely to be positive when output is positive. Results
are available in the supplementary material.
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5 Results
5.1 Does co-authorship lead to higher academic productivity?
The main question of interest is whether co-authorship affects productivity once it is discounted
by the number of authors. In this section, I provide the results of estimating model 3 without
controlling for the selection of co-authorship. Then I present estimates controlling for the
potential endogeneity of co-authorship formation.
The first-difference specifications provided in Column 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3 control for
unobservable individual heterogeneity. Column 1 of Table 3 shows the results of the first-
difference specification in which the independent variables include co-authorship, career-time
dummies, and year dummies. Column 2 adds the degree of specialization as a control variable,
and Column 3 provides estimates from a first-difference regression of Equation 1, controlling
for the rest of the time-varying factors, but not for the endogeneity of co-authorship. The
implication of these regressions is that co-authorship leads to lower academic productivity.
This result is consistent with Hollis (2001), who finds a negative effect of co-authorship on
productivity when research output is discounted by the number of authors and individual
unobserved heterogeneity is considered.
To correct for the possible bias of the co-authorship measure, the instrumenting strategy
described in section 3 is implemented. Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results controlling
for the co-authorship formation process, but not for the time-varying factors. Column 5 shows
the results from estimating Equation 1 controlling for the endogeneity of co-authorship and
controlling for the degree of specialization of the author. Column 6 introduces the rest of the
control variables: average number of co-authors papers, co-authors quality, and co-authors co-
authors quality.28 Observe that the coefficient of co-authorship becomes significantly positive
after instrumenting, which shows that individual productivity increases as authors substitute
sole-authorship for teamwork, even when co-authored output is discounted by the number of
authors. The latter suggests that the positive externalities from collaboration, not related to
quantity since co-authored articles are discounted by the number of authors, exceed the co-
ordination costs and negative externalities of collaboration. One possible explanation for the
change of the sign of the co-authorship variable after instrumenting could be that authors have
some periods where they have better ideas than in other periods. On the one hand, collabora-
tion is more likely in periods where the author has a lack of ideas, since they are more willing
28First-stage estimates are presented in the supplementary material.
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to accept any co-authored project regardless of quality. On the other hand, in periods of good
ideas, the author will only share ideas that require the skills of other researchers. Then, good
ideas not requiring specialization will be sole-authored, resulting in a positive correlation be-
tween sole-authorship and productivity (Hollis, 2001). Once the instrumental variable strategy
is implemented, only exogenous variations of the co-authorship variable through variations in
the common research interest between author i and their potential co-authors are considered.
As the distribution and fields of specialization of these potential coauthors affect the range and
diversity of dispersed knowledge that an author can access (Bonacich, 1987), having more di-
verse contacts might help an individual to create new knowledge combinations, increasing the
benefits from exogenous co-authorship.
We can observe some evidence of the presence of knowledge spillover: the higher the co-
authors productivity, the higher the productivity of the author. On the other hand, the quality
of authors at a higher distance in the co-authorship network does not affect individual perfor-
mance. I also find that the congestion externality proxied by the average number of co-authors
papers has a negative effect on individual academic productivity. For example, the busier the
co-authors of author i are, the less time they devote to research projects with this author and
the lower the output of author i is. The above network variables might be endogenous to pro-
ductivity; however, their inclusion does not significantly affect the effect of co-authorship on
academic productivity. Using the Bootstrap Hausman test, I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that both estimators of the co-authorship parameter are equivalent.29 Career time has a neg-
ative impact on productivity for authors with more than eight years of experience, consistent
with the academics’ life-cycle effects documented in Levin and Stephan (1991). Specialization
has a negative effect on productivity consistent with the findings of Belmaker et al. (2010) and
Bosquet and Combes (2013).30
I reject the null hypothesis of weak instrumental variables. Thus, the instrumental variables
are sufficiently correlated with the endogeneous variable, co-authorship. Hansen’s J test is used
for testing the null that the overidentifying moment conditions are true. From Table 3, I cannot
reject the null that the instruments are valid when the degree of specialization is included in the
model. Moreover, it is clear from the endogeneity test that the co-authorship variable cannot
be treated as exogenous.
29See the supplementary material for a description of the test.
30I also consider other specification including field fixed effects using the 121 JEL codes. The results not
presented for the sake of brevity are available upon request from the author. All the results are qualitatively
the same under this specification.
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5.2 Co-authorship and productivity across individual ‘types’
I am also interested in the relationship between co-authorship and productivity across different
types of individuals. As already pointed out by Ductor et al. (2013), it is expected that the
benefits from a collaboration differ across individuals. Access to ideas provides an opportunity,
but it takes ability and effort to publish a high-quality article. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose
that the potential benefits from collaboration vary based on the abilities and efforts of the people
involved (Ductor et al., 2013). The main hypothesis is that more-able researchers can exploit
the benefits from co-authorship to a greater extent.
In order to analyze the potential differences in co-authorship between different types of in-
dividuals, I divide the sample into four different groups depending on the productivity of the
first publication (as defined in section 3).31 Then, Equation 2 is estimated for each sub-sample.
Table 4 presents the effect of co-authorship on productivity across high- and low-productive
individuals. Column 1 shows the estimation results for authors whose first publication’s pro-
ductivity is above the 75th percentile. Column 2 presents the results for authors whose first
publication’s productivity is between the 50th and 75th percentile. Column 3 shows those in
the 25th to 50th percentile, and column 4 shows authors below the 25th percentile.
In Table 4 we can observe that the effect of co-authorship on economists productivity varies
significantly between different types of individuals. As expected, more-able authors obtain
more benefits from co-authorship. Authors whose first publication’s productivity is below the
25th percentile cannot exploit the benefits from collaboration to the same extent as highly
talented individuals those whose first publication’s productivity is above the 75th percentile.
In the summary statistics across authors (see the supplementary material) we can see a clear
assortativity in the matching process of the authors. More-able authors tend to have highly
productive co-authors, while less-able authors collaborate with low-productive researchers. It is
possible that the benefit from collaboration arises when there is a match between two different
types of authors; for example, ‘mentoring collaboration, as learning effects are likely to be
stronger in this type of collaboration. In this regard, Laband and Piette (1995) find that co-
authored articles written by authors of similar ages are more cited. On the contrary, Krapft
(2012) finds that the highest skill complementarity between two authors is achieved when their
age difference is around 10 years.
31Summary statistics reported in the supplementary material suggest that the first publication of an author
is a good predictor of the future potential performance of an author.
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6 Robustness
The main result is the positive relationship between scientific collaboration and individual
output after controlling for the endogeneity of the co-authorship. In this section, I test the
robustness of the results to the assumptions made in the estimation framework.
6.1 Different periods of analysis
In the main analysis, I considered as the period of analysis five-year over rolling window i.e.
productivity is given by yi;t,5 = log((qi,t−4 + qi,t−3 + qi,t−2 + qi,t−1 + qi,t)/5) + 1) and the co-
authorship network at period t contains links formed between t − 4 to t. In this subsection, I
check if the results are sensitive to this assumption by considering shorter periods of analysis:
three-years, two years, and one year. First, I compute all the variables for each different period,
e.g. the productivity in the three- and two-year over rolling window is yi;t,3 = log((qi,t−2+qi,t−1+
qi,t)/3) + 1) and yi;t,2 = log((qi,t−1 + qi,t)/2) + 1), respectively. As in the main analysis, only
authors who publish at least one piece of research every 10 years are considered. Consequently,
the number of missing observations increases as the period of analysis is shorted, since co-
authorship is not defined when yi;t,s is zero. Finally, the effect of co-authorship on output is
estimated using the empirical strategy described in section 3.
Table ?? suggests that the main conclusions remain; however, the numerical magnitude of
the coefficient of co-authorship, ρ, is smaller than that of the analogous coefficient in Table 3.
The externalities accrued from the network might take a long period to affect the productivity
of an author, which could explain the smaller effect of co-authorship under this shorter period
of analysis - the three and two-year over rolling windows. In Table ?? I present results based
on a one-year period, i.e. the network variables only consider links formed at period t and
the productivity is the sum of research produced in period t. This analysis provides evidence
about the time needed for the externalities of co-authorship to be transformed into publication
output. Co-authorship has a statistically significant positive effect on productivity at periods
t+ 2, t+ 3, t+ 4 and t+ 5, but the effect is not statistically significant at periods t or t+ 1 or
at periods after t + 5. Therefore, the positive effects of intellectual collaboration are reflected
in output two years after the publication of the co-authored article and may last till period
t + 5. However, the results using a one-year period should be interpreted cautiously as they
are affected by the noise introduced by the lag in economics publication and the instrumental
variables, based on information from t − 6 to t − 2, are not very relevant according to the
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Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics.32
6.2 Further robustness
In this subsection, I present the robustness of the results to the assumptions made in construct-
ing the productivity and co-authorship variables, the sample selection and the first difference
transformation. I also check the validity of the instruments to a potential threat. The details
and corresponding tables are not reported here to conserve space but are available in the online
supplementary material.
First, It is possible that I am using an inappropriate measure of productivity and co-
authorship. I examine if the results differ when productivity is defined as the journal quality
index divided by the number of authors working on the article. I also consider the JCR index
developed by Thomson Reuters (2013) as a different proxy for the journal quality impact
factor. Then, I redefine the co-authorship variable as the average number of authors for all
articles published by an author from t− 4 to t. The results show that the positive relationship
between intellectual collaboration and intellectual output is robust to the specification of the
productivity and co-authorship variables.
Second, the results presented so far correspond to authors who publish at least one piece
of research every 10-year. To check whether the results are driven by the selection, I estimate
Equation 2 using the full sample of authors by replacing missing observations of co-authorship
and network variables with zero. The 10-year selection and the full sample analysis may lead
to an excessive number of zeroes for those authors who do not publish regularly. To check if the
excessive number of zeroes may lead to a spurious positive correlation between co-authorship
and productivity, I re-estimate Equation 2 using authors who publish at least one article every
five-year. The results presented in the online supplementary material show that the main
conclusions remain under these different samples.
Third, I investigate whether results are sensitive to the transformation used to eliminate the
individual fixed-effects of Equation 1. I consider for robustness forward orthogonal deviations
instead of first difference. The results are qualitatively the same.
Finally, I evaluate the validity of the instruments to a potential internal threat. The main
identification strategy relies on the assumption that the past common research overlap between
an author and her potential co-authors does not affect future changes in productivity through
32Alternative specifications including lags of the dependent variable has been considered but the results were
very similar and are not reported since the differences of the lags were statistically insignificant.
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channels other than co-authorship. However, it is possible that an author might change her
degree of field specialization to meet productive potential co-authors and obtain benefits from
them that are not passed to productivity through co-authorship – e.g. ‘favoritism’ in the review
process. In an attempt to evaluate the validity of the instruments to this threat, I estimate
how changes in the research overlap between an author and her co-authors are affected by the
average productivity of her potential co-authors. The results show that authors do not change
their degree of specialization according to the productivity of their past co-authors’ co-authors.
7 Conclusions and discussion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of intellectual collaboration on individual academic
productivity. The approach proposed allows one to control for unobservable heterogeneity, time-
varying factors, and for the potential endogeneity of teamwork formation. No previous studies
have controlled for all of these potential sources of endogeneity simultaneously. The analysis
reveals the following:
First, greater collaboration leads to higher academic productivity even after discounting by
the number of authors who worked on an article. The positive relationship between intellectual
collaboration and intellectual output is in contrast with Medoff (2003) and Hollis (2001), who
find a negative relationship between co-authorship and academic output.
Second, co-authorship selection is endogenous – i.e. authors choose with whom to work
depending on the quality and difficulty of their projects, which shows that previous results might
be spurious. Specifically, the results turn from a significant negative effect of co-authorship on
individual academic productivity in the baseline model to a significant positive effect in the
specification after controlling for the endogenous team formation.
Third, over-specialization is detrimental to an authors productivity. I also find evidence for
the presence of peer effects and congestion externalities in academic research.
Finally, the effect of co-authorship on economists productivity varies significantly between
the different types of individuals. More-able authors obtain more benefits from teamwork. That
is, authors whose first publications productivity is above the 75th percentile can exploit the
externalities obtained from collaboration to a greater extent. This might be a consequence of
the high assortativity in the matching process, which suggests that more-able authors mainly
collaborate with authors of a similar type – highly productive.
The results raise an important question: if co-authorship leads to higher academic produc-
tivity, why may individuals not choose the optimal level of co-authorship? Constraints from
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collaboration can lead authors to exert a level of collaboration below the social optimum: col-
laboration involves compromises when working in a group, individual authors have to agree
on ideas, texts, approaches, or even conclusions proposed by others (Hudson, 1996). There
are also costs associated with finding and assessing co-authors, and organization and coordi-
nation costs (He et al., 2009). There are also ex-post transaction costs incurred by the need
for coordinating, monitoring, and enforcing the contractual promises of inputs from co-authors
(Landry and Amara, 1998). The impossibility of anticipating all these costs may discourage
private collaboration. Other factors that may lead private agents to choose inefficient levels of
collaboration are the tendency of authors to attribute their success to their own characteris-
tics and their failures to external factors (self-serving biases), and uncertainty about the ability,
motivation, and effort levels of their potential co-authors. Corgnet (2010) finds that incomplete
information will lead to an inefficient level of teamwork as authors are not able to identify the
abilities of every potential co-author. He also finds that authors with self-serving biases tend to
over-value their contribution to the co-authored project and will decide to write sole-authored
projects that could be more efficiently done under collaboration. As a result, policies induc-
ing individuals to collaborate may lead to the socially optimal level of collaboration in cases
where organizational constraints are important, when there is uncertainty about co-authors
abilities (e.g. collaboration involving juniors without an established publication record), and
when self-serving biases are present.
The results are also important for economists, as collaboration between them might en-
hance their performance, and therefore facilitate access to research funding, higher salaries,
and prestige.
Future studies could analyze the effect of the different types of collaboration – e.g. mentor-
ing and inter-disciplinary collaboration – on academic productivity, as the benefits are likely
to be greater. Mentoring collaboration could probably facilitate the learning process of juniors
authors and increase their current and future research output, while inter-disciplinary collabo-
ration combines different types of knowledge and ideas that could lead to greater benefits from
collaboration.
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Table 1: Percentage of co-authored articles across time and journal quality
Decade/Quality ≥50 20-50 10-20 1-10 ≤1
1970s 28 31 34 26 21
1980s 46 38 45 37 27
1990s 62 49 54 48 38
2000s 50 64 59 59 48
2010 and 2011 59 70 71 68 59
1970-2011 52 47 53 50 40
Number of Journals 6 12 26 136 750
Number of Articles 12,560 22,562 39,685 148,174 338,841
Column 1 shows the percentage of co-authored articles for journals with a quality index
above 50, Column 2 shows journals with a quality index between 20 and 50, Column
3 presents journals with a quality index between 10 and 20, Column 4 journals with a
quality between 1 and 10, and Column 5 journals with a quality index below 1.
Table 2: Summary statistics of the data
Variables Low Co-authorship High Co-authorship
mean st.d. mean st.d.
Productivity 1.92 7.84 2.33 8.79
Quality 2.01 7.55 2.14 7.38
Experience 6.78 6.77 6.77 6.48
Co-authorship .13 .32 .86 .32
Avg. Coauthors’ Productivity 2.62 9.82 2.13 8.44
Avg. Coauthors’ Coauthor Prod. 3.58 10.23 2.89 9.02
Avg. Coauthors’ papers .59 1.04 .53 .96
Research overlap with Coauthors’ Coauthor .37 .32 .31 .30
Degree of Specialization .31 .34 .29 .33
Number of Observations 235, 136 235, 136 684, 403 684, 403
Number of Authors 66, 673 66, 673 167, 903 167, 903
Column 1 presents summary statistics of authors whose average lifetime co-authorship is below or equal to 0.5. Column 2 shows
summary statistics of authors with an average lifetime co-authorship greater than 0.5. These statistics correspond to the ‘active’
author sample and publications from 1974 to 2011. Co-authorship and network variables statistics are not defined for authors without
co-authors in a given year. All the variables are obtained using one-year period.
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Table 4: The effect of co-authorship on academic productivity across individual types: instrumental
variable fist-difference GMM estimation using a 5-year over rolling window
(1) ≥ 75% (2) 50-75% (3) 25-50% (4) ≤ 25%
Co-authorship 1.7181*** 1.4570*** 0.9932*** 0.7191**
(0.4591) (0.4051) (0.3582) (0.3135)
Degree of Specialization -0.7307*** -0.4351*** -0.3363*** -0.3059***
(0.0225) (0.0187) (0.0164) (0.0138)
Avg. Co-authors’ productivity 0.0013*** 0.0022*** 0.0020*** 0.0019***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Avg. Co-authors’ Co-author Prod. -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0010***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Avg. Number of Co-authors Papers -0.0284*** -0.0246*** -0.0170*** -0.0126**
(0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0052)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Career-time FE YES YES YES YES
Number of Authors 10,805 9,768 9,137 8,073
Number of Observations 100,568 72,596 62,356 52,821
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 18.902 13.880 12.365 12.625
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.005(0.9441) 0.290(0.5902) 0.328(0.5666) 1.654 (0.1984)
Endogeneity Test (p-value) 31.719(0.0000) 31.855(0.0000) 14.961(0.0001) 9.575(0.0020)
Column 1 shows the estimation results for authors whose first publication’s productivity is above the 75th percentile. Column 2 presents the
results for authors whose first publication’s productivity is between the 50th and 75th percentile. Column 3 shows those in the 25th to 50th
percentile, and column 4 shows authors below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in parenthesis adjusted for clusters.∗∗∗ Significant at 1%
level, ∗∗ Significant at 5%.
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Table 5: The effect of co-authorship on academic productivity assuming a different period of analysis:
instrumental variable first-differences GMM estimation using a 3 and 2-year over rolling window
(1) 3-years (2) 2-years
Co-authorship 1.1818*** 0.9409**
(0.3334) (0.4187)
Avg. Co-authors’ productivity 0.0018*** 0.0025***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Avg. Co-authors’ co-authors productivity 0.0006* 0.0011*
(0.0003) (0.0006)
Degree of Specialization -0.6458*** -0.6459***
(0.0088) (0.0094)
Avg. Number of Co-authors Papers -0.0288*** -0.0382**
(0.0092) (0.0188)
Number of Observations 286,751 278,711
Year Dummies YES YES
Career-time dummies YES YES
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 22.975 10.050
Hansen J-test (p-value) 2.810(0.0937) 0.373 (0.5412)
Endogeneity Test (p-value) 24.914(0.0000) 11.164(0.0008)
Column 1 shows the results of estimating the causal effect of co-authorship on productivity using a 3-year
over rolling window. The sample of articles analyzed in Column 1 is from 1978-2011. The results using
2-year over rolling window are presented in Column 2 and include all the articles published from 1977-2011.
I consider authors who publish at least a piece of research every 10 years, i.e. active sample. Year and
career time fixed effects are included in the analysis, but are not reported here to conserve space. Standard
errors in parenthesis adjusted for clusters.∗∗∗ Significant at 1% level, ∗∗ Significant at 5%.
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